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Abstract
This paper proposes an all encompassing test methodology for firewalls. It extends the life cycle model to revisit
the major phases of the life cycle after a firewall is in service as foundations for the tests. The focus of the tests is
to show that the firewall is, or isn’t, still fit for purpose. It also focuses on the traceability between business
requirements through to policy, rule sets, physical design, implementation, egress and ingress testing, monitoring
and auditing. The guidelines are provided by a Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP). The methodology is
very much process driven and in keeping with the Security Systems Engineering Capability Maturity Model (SSECMM). This provides multiple advantages, including the capture of configuration errors, results are measurable
and repeatable, assurance is developed and it can be used as a roadmap for process improvement. Sample tests
are provided in the paper, but act merely as a guideline. It would be expected that the test and evaluation master
plan be tailored for any specific organisation.
Keywords
Firewall, test, methodology, TEMP, SSE-CMM.

INTRODUCTION
It is not simply enough to purchase a firewall from a vendor, install, configure, test and monitor it just because it
is considered a best practice to have a firewall. This kind of thinking could easily result in a less than effectual
solution. The objective of this paper is to outline an effective methodology to test the firewall from as many
perspectives as possible. Testing the firewall goes far beyond conducting penetration tests using the tools
hackers would use. Testing must begin with examining business rules, legislation and internal IT requirements.
These must be translated into constraints in the form of policy documentation. It should hardly be surprising that
business rules change regularly. New business relationships are formed, internal structures are changed, business
strategic focus shifts to new markets, technology advances and new legislation is introduced. As a result,
policies must be regularly reviewed and updated through a formal and procedural testing process.
Policies must be used as the inputs to the design of the network topology and the development of rule sets.
There are various types of firewalls including application gateways, circuit gateways, packet filtering and MAC
layer firewalls, all of which operate at different levels in the OSI model. The result is that they perform
differently. Hybrid firewalls merge the various types of firewalls into one. The design and implementation must
be traceable and testable against the policy documents. Otherwise, the resultant firewall may not meet the
requirements and specifications in policy. Rule sets are highly integrated with the firewall topological design
and are instrumental in functionality and must be tested as well, especially when rules are introduced or
modified. The rule sets must be under configuration control to ensure any changes are validated and are
traceable.
Appropriate test plans must be written, reviewed, performed and evaluated to ensure that the firewall complies
with policy. Test plans are driven by policy and must test the rule sets and the implementation. Firewall rule
anomalies can be detrimental to security and performance and they must be determined and resolved through
testing. The firewall must also be tested from an ingress and egress point of view and these tests must be
reflected in the firewall logs. A significant component of the test plan should be the expected results. The
firewall should behave as a predictable system.
The resultant test report must list the tools used as well as the results. The results of the test can then used to
modify policy, rules and design if required.
The entire process could be quite complex in a large network, especially where artefacts of the policy creation
process, design decisions, purchasing assessments, test plan development and test results must be documented.
Traceability of these artefacts can be managed though the use of systems and software engineering traceability
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software such as Telelogic Doors or IBM Rational Requisite Pro products, or a specialised database can be
produced. This would assist in modifying policies as business rules change, and subsequently identify firewall
rules that need to be modified and tests that need to be changed. Firewall rule datasets must be kept under
version control and configuration control.
Test Plan Development
A Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) functions as a blue print for the test activities, and is comprised of
the following activities discussed by Cole, Krutz and Conley (2005, p.55).
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

A detailed test plan for complete test coverage of the system under test.
Communicates the extent and nature of the tests.
Schedule of events.
Specification of equipment and organizational requirements.
Definition of the test methodology.
Construction of a deliverables list.
Determination of the expected outputs.
Instructions on how to carry out the tests.
Record of the test inputs and results.

Development of the TEMP is instrumental to the effective and comprehensive testing of the firewall, and should
be initiated during the initial design phase of the firewall. It can be updated as time evolves and should also form
the foundation of the artefacts of the test process. It also indicates a maturity in security systems engineering of
the organization.
Methodology
The Security Systems Engineering Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM) identifies a framework to measure
and improve the performance of security systems engineering practices (SSE-CMM Project, 2003). Its scope
covers the life cycle of security systems. The phases of the life cycle include concept definition, requirements
analysis, design, development, integration, installation, operations, maintenance and decommissioning. Each of
these phases have associated mile stones, and are usually marked by the end of test activities and/or reviews. By
following processes and practices in a formal fashion, confidence in repeatable results should be attained. The
SSE-CMM can be used to rate the maturity of an organization’s security engineering practices.
Developing defined processes provides many benefits. It allows knowledge gained in previous efforts to be used
in the future, resulting in the ability to accurately predict how much effort in time and manpower is required to
perform similar functions. It ensures that results are repeatable and measurable. It enhances efficiencies, and
provides confidence that security needs are being met.
Business requirements, legislation, business partnerships and business rules are the predominant drivers for the
development of firewall policy. They are the constraints that limit what is passed in and out of the organisation
through the internet. This in turn provides impetus for design changes and subsequent test activities of the
firewall including ingress and egress testing. As the firewall enters service, it must be monitored and audited.
Changes in business rules, threats and the development of new technologies will most likely impact policy,
firewall rules, test procedures, monitoring and auditing. These changes may cascade through of their own
volition, but assurance is more likely if a comprehensive test plan is followed that checks the status of each
component.
Figure 1 below shows the cyclical flow diagram of the six phases of the proposed firewall testing methodology.
Each phase has associated activities of risk assessment, test and evaluation, review, reporting and version
control. It is very similar to the life cycle phases, but the idea is to revisit these phases to ensure that the design
is complying with legislation, business requirements, performance and security requirements. The fundamental
idea is to determine if the firewall is still fit for purpose. It starts with checking business requirements to which
everything should be traceable to. This would suit a desktop review, or a proactive meeting to determine short
term and long term requirements. This is followed by testing firewall policy to ensure that it reflects
requirements and is testable and enforceable. The rule set is then developed or re-examined. The rule set is then
tested to ensure that it is traceable to policy and that anomalies in the rule set have not crept in. The rule set
should be maintained under configuration control. The next step is to ensure that the design is fit for purpose as
well. This checks that the design is appropriate, network diagrams are audited to ensure that they are technically
sound and that the network architecture is properly reflected in the diagrams which should be under version
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control. Implementation tests may be a monthly test to check a percentage of the physical network against the
diagrams. This helps to ensure that the firewall is not being bypassed by rogue access points. Implementation
also checks other physical security issues such as the location of the firewall and to confirm it is in a secure
location, and the alarms and locks work. This is followed by ingress and egress testing to ensure that the firewall
is functioning correctly. This is followed by ensuring that monitoring and auditing activities, which should be
defined in policy, are being performed correctly.
Although the TEMP provides the guidelines, schedules, procedures of the tests, the test results, reports, network
diagrams, rule sets and authorizations should all be under version control or configuration control. They must be
easily accessible by security staff for the purposes of audit, or in the event of a security breach where they will
come under scrutiny. It also shows a maturity in process, and time required for test activities can be accurately
predicted and budgeted for.
The following sections discuss the testing of each component of the methodology in more detail. It should be
clear that the cycle is never ending. Each section provides justifications for testing of each phase together with a
sample checklist. It should be clear that the tests listed are suggestions only. It would be up to each organization
to tailor their own tests to ensure that the overall design and implementation is fit for purpose as defined in
policy.

Figure 1. Cyclical flow diagram of the test methodology.
Policy Development and Testing
Policies must accurately reflect the business needs of the organization. Business rules, partnerships, legislation,
risk assessments and technological requirements form the constraints from which policy is developed.
Traceability must exist between policy and these requirements to show that policy is protecting business
functionality. This also assists in developing assurance. “Assurance is defined as the measure of confidence that
the security features and architecture of an information system accurately mediate and enforce an organization’s
information system security policy” (Cole et.al., 2005, p.591).
Steps recommended by NIST to develop firewall policy (2002, p33) include:
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•

Identify necessary network applications – These are the applications required to meet business rules
and partnerships. It could include having a mail server, web services, and a virtual private network.
These are all necessary for the business to operate.
Identify any vulnerability associated with the applications – The applications could have vulnerabilities
and these need to be researched. Threats need to be determined, as well as associated mitigation
strategies. The results of these activities must be delivered in the form of a risk analysis document.
Perform a cost benefit analysis of various methods that can secure the application – This assists in
determining if the benefit of having the application outweighs the potential cost. If having the
application is going to cost more in terms of employment of security measures than the revenue it will
deliver, then it may not be an economically feasible operation.
Create an application traffic matrix which shows the protection method - The development of a firewall
policy can be assisted by the development of an applications traffic matrix. An example of which is
shown as table 1 below (NIST, 2002, p.33).
Create the firewall rule set from the application traffic matrix – A significant measure of traceability
should be evident using the above steps in the development of the rule set. This provides assurance and
especially that a maturity has been demonstrated by using process.

•
•

•
•

Table 1
Sample Application Traffic Matrix
TCP/IP
Application
Service
HTTP
SMTP/POP

Location

Internal Host
Type

Internal Host
Security Policy

Any
Any

Unix
Unix

SSH

Specified
Locations

Unix

Proxy
Anti Spam,
Mail Policy
Remote Access
Policy

NetBIOS

Any

Windows

Limit Access to
Shares

NFS

Any

Unix

Limit Exports

Firewall
Security Policy
(Internal)
Permit
Permit

Firewall
Security Policy
(External)
Permit
Permit

Permit

Reject All,
except by
Written
Authorization
Reject

Permit Local
Domain Only;
Reject Others
Reject

Reject

Testing and auditing the firewall helps to provide the assurance that is required, but it is essential that policies
are written so that they can be implemented and are individually testable. Moyer and Schultz (n.d., p.3) discuss a
number of issues that must be answered from the testing process, and are summarized as follows. A firewall
must effectively implement policy, and testing to ensure that the firewall implements policy correctly is critical.
Policies should be written such that they are testable to ensure compliance. The policy should work hand in
glove with the network services that are required. It must be determined if the firewall and other network
components provide adequate protection from attacks initiated from external sources. The testing process can
help to indicate the ability of the firewall to resist attacks, and help to refine the firewall policy in an iterative
and recursive development process. It is equally important to test the firewall from the inside too. Internal
weaknesses may exist and these potential leakages must be identified. It is also important to determine how
much information about the network is available from the internet. Attacks from the internet can include being
able to map the network and determine its configuration.
Policies and rule sets can be peer reviewed on paper, and must have associated test criteria that will have
definitive results, with either a pass or fail. All tests, results and reports are artefacts of the test life cycle of the
firewall and should be retained. This assists in the iterative test life cycle of the firewall as it evolves and
changes as business requirements and technology change. The policies and rule sets should be reviewed
regularly to ensure effectiveness. This also assists with traceability and justifications for design and test
decisions. Sample policy tests that could be developed further are listed below in table 2.
Firewall Physical Design
Firewalls are usually either appliance type devices or software systems that run over an underlying operating
system. Whitman and Mattord (2005, p.241) list five major processing categories of firewalls as packet filtering

Page 20

Proceedings of The 5th Australian Information Security Management Conference
firewalls, application gateways, circuit gateways, MAC layer firewalls and hybrids. Each different type typically
operates at different layers in the Open System Interconnect (OSI) model. Firewalls can also offer additional
services such as Network Address Translation (NAT), encryption functionality through a Virtual Private
Network (VPN), Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) and application content filtering (NIST, 2002,
p.4). Firewalls can be configured in a variety of network connection architectures. These include packet filtering

Table 2 Policy Tests
Test

Description

Identification of
Network Applications
Vulnerability
Assessment

Identification of all network applications

Threat Assessment

Perform a threat assessment of network
applications

Risk Assessment

Perform a risk assessment of network
applications

Cost Benefit Analysis

Perform a cost benefit analysis of network
applications

Application Traffic
Matrix

Develop an application traffic matrix

Policy

Develop firewall policy

Peer Review of Policy

Peer review of firewall policy

Date

Checked By

Result

Perform a vulnerability assessment of
network applications

routers, screened host firewalls, dual homed host firewalls, screened subnet firewalls (with DMZ) and SOCKS
servers (Whitman et.al., 2005, p256-260). Firewalls can be placed within the organizations intranet to separate
LANs, or as a bastion host to the hostile internet.
This shows how much consideration has to go into selecting the right firewall for the right purpose at the right
time. There are performance issues to consider, as well as operational and monitoring factors, fitness for
purpose, operational costs, vulnerabilities, threats, business rules, and partnerships. Not only do all these factors
have to be considered at design time, they also have to be considered during testing during its service life.
Artefacts of the original design decisions should have been retained, and the criteria that were used for that
phase of the life cycle should be reviewed to ensure that they still meet current and future requirements. Other
considerations include performing a physical inspection of the network to ensure that the firewall is not being
bypassed, and that network diagrams are up to date. Sample tests are shown in table 3 below.
Table 3 Firewall Physical Design Tests
Test
Original Design Criteria
Network Diagrams

Description
Is the original design criteria still valid?
Can any new criteria be identified?
Are the network diagrams up to date?
Are the network diagrams technically
correct?

Physical Inspection

Is the network configured as per the
network diagrams?

Fitness for Purpose

Is the design still effective?

Threat Assessment

List threats to physical design

Risk Assessment

Assess the risks for the physical design.

Performance
Measurement

Is the firewall an excessive bottleneck to
performance?

Date

Checked By

Result

Page 21

Proceedings of The 5th Australian Information Security Management Conference
Firewall Rule Anomaly Discovery
“Serious attention has to be given to rule relations and interactions in order to determine the proper rule ordering
and guarantee correct security policy semantics” (Al-Shaer, Hamed , 2004, p.1). As the rule set increases, the
addition of new rules or modification of existing rules must not conflict with the intent of policy. Anomalies
may be introduced if the rule set is not optimised, leading to a less than effective firewall implementation, in
terms of both performance and security. In the worst case, it could introduce a vulnerability to the network
resulting from a misconfiguration of the firewall rules. The rules are modified as business rules and relationships
change, technologies are introduced and removed, administrators come and go, and best practices evolve.
Various modelling algorithms have been developed to discover anomalies within the firewall rules. Anomaly
classifications listed by Al-Shaer et.al., using the rule set listed in table 4, and the network diagram in figure 2,
include the following:
Shadowing Anomaly – A shadowed rule will never be activated because a previous rule matches the same
packets. This may result in packets that should be denied to be permitted, or packets that should be permitted,
denied. For example, rule 4 is shadowed by rule 3 in table 4.
Correlation Anomaly – Rules can be correlated if one rule matches some packets from a second rule, whilst
some packets from the second rule match some packets from the first rule. An example of this is demonstrated
by rules one and three in table 4. Rule 1’s intention is to deny http traffic from address 140.192.37.20, and rule
three accepts all source addresses to destination address 161.120.33.40. If the order is reversed, the traffic
denied in rule one will be accepted.
Generalization Anomaly – If one rule matches a preceding rule, have different actions, and if the first rule
matches the second rule, the second rule is a generalisation of the first rule. This is demonstrated where rule 1 in
table 4 denies http traffic from 140.192.37.20, but rule 2 would accept the traffic from the same address.
Redundancy Anomaly – If policy will not be affected if a rule is removed, the rule is redundant. Rule 7 is
redundant because rule 6 matches the same condition, and rule nine is redundant to rule 10. Rules 7 and 9 can
then be removed.
Irrelevance Anomaly – If a rule does not match a domain that is catered for by the firewall, then it is an
irrelevant rule and can be removed to improve the firewalls performance. Rule 11 is irrelevant because the
140.192.38.* network and the 161.120.35.* networks are not part of the domain on the inside of the firewall.
Table 5 lists possible tests that could be conducted in a desktop review of the rule sets.

140.192.37.0
Network

Firewall

Internet

161.120.33.0
Network

Figure 2. Network architecture for the rules in table 4.
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Table 4 Firewall filtering policy (Al-Shaer et.al., 2004, p.2)

Rule

Source

Source

Destination

Destination

Address

Port

Address

Port

Number

Protocol

Action

1

tcp

140.192.37.20

any

*.*.*.*

80

deny

2

tcp

140.192.37.*

any

*.*.*.*

80

accept

3

tcp

*.*.*.*

any

161.120.33.40

80

accept

4

tcp

140.192.37.30

any

161.120.33.40

80

deny

5

tcp

140.192.37.30

any

*.*.*.*

21

deny

6

tcp

140.192.37.*

any

*.*.*.*

21

accept

7

tcp

140.192.37.*

any

161.120.33.40

21

accept

8

tcp

*.*.*.*

any

*.*.*.*

any

deny

9

udp

140.192.37.*

any

161.120.33.40

53

accept

10

udp

*.*.*.*

any

161.120.33.40

53

accept

11

udp

140.192.38.*

any

161.120.35.*

any

accept

12

udp

*.*.*.*

any

*.*.*.*

any

deny

Table 5
Rule Set Tests

Test

Description

Peer Review

Peer review of rule sets

Traceable to Policy

Check that the rules are traceable to policy

Anomalies

Check for shadowing anomalies?

Date

Checked By

Result

Check for correlation anomalies?
Check for generalization anomalies?
Check for redundancy anomalies?
Check for irrelevance anomalies?
Implementation

Are the rules implemented as per the rule set
properly?

Implementation Testing
Best practices recommend testing the physical security of the environment the firewall is in (NIST, 2002, p.39).
Physical access to firewalls must be limited to only those that need access to them. They should be in secure
areas that employ monitored alarms, are intruder resistant and protected from disasters such as fire and flood.
Electrical supplies should be considered including the supply of an Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS). Air
conditioning and air filtration are environmental controls that may also be required to be tested. Table 6 below
contains a checklist of possible inspection tests for physical security of the firewall.
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Table 6 Physical Security Tests

Test
Intruder Resistant

Description

Date

Checked By

Result

Is the facility resistant to intruders?
Locks on doors that work?
Floor to ceiling walls?

Monitored Alarm

Is there a monitored Alarm?
Is there a motion detector?
Is there a fire detector?
Is there a fire control system?

UPS

Is there a UPS?
How long can the UPS supply current for?
Is there line conditioning?

Air Conditioning

Is the temperature of the facility below 25ºC?

Disaster Resistant

Is the facility resistant to disasters?

Ingress and Egress Testing
For the purpose of demonstration, the network topology as shown in figure 3 was configured on VMware using
BackTrack 1.0 as the attack platform, Fedora Core 5 configured with iptables v1.3.5 as the firewall, and the
three servers in the DMZ simulated by the honeypot software, honeyd 1.5b. The simulated internet is on a
separate virtual LAN to the servers in the DMZ.
The firewall is fairly simplistic for demonstration purposes and focuses on servers in the DMZ, as well as the
internet facing firewall. The firewall was configured to masquerade the servers in the DMZ using the following
commands:
# Set Policy, drop all packets on all chains
iptables –P INPUT DROP
iptables –P OUTPUT DROP
iptables –P FORWARD DROP
# Drop all packets with unknown connection states, and that do not have a current connection
iptables –A FORWARD –m state –state INVALID –j DROP
# Allow packets which are from an existing connection
iptables –A FORWARD –m state –state RELATED,ESTABLISHED –j ACCEPT
# eth0 is facing the DMZ, eth1 is facing the internet
iptables –A FORWARD –i eth0 –o eth1 –j ACCEPT
iptables –A FORWARD –i eth0 –o eth0 –j ACCEPT
# Setup network address translation so that the 10.0.0.0 network is hidden from the internet, and the interface
# that is connected to the internet is eth1
iptables –t nat –A POSTROUTING –s 10.0.0.0/24 –o eth1 –j MASQUERADE
# Use the masquerading to send the right protocol to the right address in the DMZ
iptables –t nat –A PREROUTING –p tcp –dport 53 –j DNAT –to-destination 10.0.0.2
iptables –t nat –A PREROUTING –p tcp –dport 80 –j DNAT –to-destination 10.0.0.3
iptables –t nat –A PREROUTING –p tcp –dport 25 –j DNAT –to-destination 10.0.0.4
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# Drop anything that is trying to use the private IP address

Remote Attacker

Internet

203.59.66.1

10.0.0.2

Windows 2003
ISA Proxy
DNS

10.0.0.3

Redhat Linux 8.0
Apache Web Service
MySQL

10.0.0.1

Switch

10.0.0.4
10.0.0.5

Windows 2003
SMTP

DMZ

Trusted Network

Figure 3. DMZ Topology
iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -i eth1 -s 10.0.0.0/8 -j DROP
The Firewall Analysis Template from the OSSTM (Herzog, 2003, p.86) is an example of access control testing.
The following lists the tests suggested by Herzog, together with commands using common tools that will realize
his recommendations using the topology given above. An attacker could quickly locate the pseudo IP address of
the web server as 203.59.66.1, and no doubt would consider this as a first point of attack.
Fingerprinting - uses packet response to fingerprint the firewall. nmap can be used to try to determine the make
of the firewall, as well as any services it may be running.
nmap –sS –O –PI –PT 203.59.66.1
The result of the scan shows that only the SMTP, DNS and HTTP only services were detected, which is a good
result.
Stealth – a SYN stealth scan through the firewall in an attempt at enumeration.
nmap –sS –PI –PT 203.59.66.1 –p 80
In this case, it didn’t add any new information.
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Source port control – scan of specific common, source ports for enumeration. If the firewall allows DNS
transfers (port 53), or FTP data (port 20) nmap’s –g option allows you to spoof the value of the source port.
nmap –sF –g 53 203.59.66.1
Again nothing new added.
Overlap – uses overlapped fragments such as a teardrop DoS attack.
This would be more effective as a DDoS attack using a tool such as Shaft or Tribal Flood Network.
Fragments – determines if the firewall can handle fragmented packets. This uses nmap’s –f switch to send
fragmented packets. Splitting up the TCP header over several packets makes it much harder for packet filters to
detect an attack.
nmap –sS –f 203.59.66.1
Again, this offered no new information.
SYN flood – can the firewall cope with a series of SYN packets?
Require a SYN flood generator
RST flag – how does the firewall respond to packets with the RST flag set?
UDP – how does the firewall manage standard UDP packets?
ACK – uses ACK packets for enumeration purposes.
nmap –sA –O –PI –PT 203.59.66.1
This determined nothing new.
FIN – uses FIN packets for enumeration purposes.
nmap –sF –O –PI –PT 203.59.66.1
This revealed nothing new.
NULL – uses null packets for enumeration purposes.
nmap –sN –O –PI –PT 203.59.66.1
WIN – uses win packets for enumeration purposes.
nmap –sW –O –PI –PT 203.59.66.1
XMAS – uses packets with all flags set for enumeration purposes.
nmap –sX –O –PI –PT 203.59.66.1
Sustained TCP connections – is the firewall susceptible to a denial of service attack?
This would be more effective as a DDoS attack using a tool such as Shaft or Tribal Flood Network.
Fleeting TCP connections – is the firewall susceptible to a denial of service attack?
This would be more effective as a DDoS attack using a tool such as Shaft or Tribal Flood Network.
Streaming UDP throughput - the firewall susceptible to a denial of service attack?
This would be more effective as a DDoS attack using a tool such as Shaft or Tribal Flood Network.
ICMP responses – how does the firewall respond to different types of ICMP packets?
Page 26

Proceedings of The 5th Australian Information Security Management Conference

Spoof responses – can IP addresses be used to determine the access control list?
nmap –S 10.0.0.1 –e eth0 203.59.66.1
Firewall blocked ok.
Protocol – can the firewall stop packets using various protocols?
The results show that the firewall was effective at masquerading the true IP addresses of the servers in the DMZ.
The list suggested by Herzog has been composed into a test template below as table 7. An additional test was
added that was not explicitly in Herzog’s list. That is, is it possible to determine the firewall rule set? This could
possibly be done using a tool such as firewalk.
Table 7 OSSTM Access Control Test List
Test
Fingerprinting
Stealth
Source Port Control
Overlap

Description

Ports open?
Can overlap fragments pass?

SYN Flood

Does the firewall handle a SYN flood?
What happens when the RST flag is set?

UDP

Are standard UDP packets handled?

ACK

Use ACK for enumeration

FIN

Use FIN for enumeration

WIN
XMAS

Result

Scan through the firewall?

Does the firewall handle fragmented packets?

NULL

Checked By

Determine the make of the firewall?

Fragments
RST Flag

Date

Use NULL packets for enumeration
Use WIN packets for enumeration
Set all flags in packet for enumeration

Sustained TCP
Connections

Susceptible to a DOS via sustained TCP
connections?

Fleeting TCP
Connections

Susceptible to a DOS via fleeting TCP
connections?

Streaming UDP
Throughput

Susceptible to a DOS attack?

ICMP Responses

Try various ICMP packets

Spoof Responses

Can IP addresses be spoofed to determine the
ACL?

Protocol

What happens when various protocols are
tried?

Determination of
Rule Sets

Can the rule set be determined by using a tool
such as firewalk?

Monitoring and Auditing
Monitoring and auditing activities should be reflected in policy. Monitoring may be in conjunction with other
security systems such as an Intrusion Detection System. Table 8 below shows a sample checklist for testing
monitoring and auditing activities.
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Table 8 Monitoring and Auditing Tests
Test
Monitoring
Auditing

Description
Logging occurring correctly?
Providing inputs to IDS?

Date

Checked By

Result

Complying with auditing policy?

Documentation
The results of the tests should be reported, reviewed and archived. They should be available for consultation
prior to each test to compare previous results. The rule sets should be under configuration control, with
authorisation required to make changes. Documents under version control should include the TEMP, policy and
network diagrams. All documentation should be available if required by authorised personnel, especially for
times of audit, or a security breach investigation.
The complexity of the traceability can be managed in a requirements management tool such as Telelogic’s
Doors, Rational’s Requisite Pro, or a customised database with a forms front end. If a business requirement is
modified, related policy, rule sets, design, ingress and egress testing, and monitoring relationships can be
brought to the attention of the security personnel and modified appropriately. This maintains assurance,
improves testing response and facilitates good management.

CONCLUSION
The objective of this paper has been to show that there is far more to testing a firewall than just performing
ingress and egress testing. Business rules, legislation, technology and business partnerships evolve and drive
changes that cascade through policy, rule sets, ingress and egress testing, monitoring and auditing. A cyclical
methodology was discussed that outlines a plan that checks that everything is traceable back through to business
requirements. Policy should be directly traceable to business requirements, and the design of the firewall
including rule sets and physical design should be traceable to policy. Ingress and egress tests must be traceable
to the design and auditing and monitoring must be reflected in policy. The purpose is to ensure that the design is
fit for purpose in a cyclical fashion that never ends. This can help to capture configuration errors, to optimise
performance, and to be proactive in meeting business requirements.
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